

Centesimus Annus Ten Years Later: John Paul II on the *Munus Regale*

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The tenth anniversary of Pope John Paul II's encyclical *Centesimus annus* was marked on May 1st this year. Its importance for the social doctrine of the Church can be gathered from the new *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, where we find it quoted or cited 37 times — more than any other pontifical document in history. Everyone here will already know that *CA* was written to celebrate two events.

First, to mark the centenary of Leo XIII's *Rerum novarum* (1891). Remarkably, Leo wrote some 110 encyclicals and other public letters, 60 of which dealt with the problem of the state and the social order. But the subsequent papal teaching calendar has been set to *RN*. At every 25-year interval since 1891, the reigning pope has had something to say about that encyclical.¹

Second, the Pope presents *CA* as an “interpretive re-reading [*relegantur*]” of the Church's social doctrine in reference to the events of 1989 — the series of bloodless revolutions which began in Poland and swept through central and eastern Europe. These events represent a closing chapter in a long history of the modern state. Proximately, we could mark this history from about the time of Wojtyla's birth in 1920, just after WWI. For all practical purposes, that War destroyed the last vestiges of Christian kingship: in 1918 the Habsburgs in Austria, the Romanovs in Russia, the Hohenzollerns in Prussia and the Wittlesbachs in Bavaria ceased to exist. Karol Josef Wojtyla was born into a central European world whose fate was not to be decided by families and princes who still had something of the odor of Christian kingship.

But 1989 can be seen in a much longer history. In 1500 there were about 500 independent political units in Europe; when Leo wrote *RN* there were 25. A millennium of king-making, which rendered every person in Europe subject to some prince, gave way to state-making. There is, of course, a vast literature on what make a polity a state-making regime.² But I suppose that everyone would agree that state-making regimes are marked by the following: (1) territoriality, rather than nationality or religion; (2) systematic taxation; (3) the transformation of the court culture into a professional body of civil servants; (4) monopoly over lethal force, with the creation of standing armies and internal police forces; (5) monopoly, over education — which is perhaps the most powerful instrument of state-making; (6) and, finally, what everyone takes to be the chief characteristic of the modern state, *sovereignty* — as Jean Bodin

defined it in 1576, sovereignty is absolute, perpetual, and indivisible power. In the revolutionary era of the 18th and 19th centuries, this predicate was transferred to the people, who became a sovereign who reigns but does not rule.

When we think of modern man we think of the Enlightenment, the sovereignty of reason, and of ideologies of liberty; we think especially of his technologies. But his greatest and most sustained work was the state. If we ask a modern man who or what is sovereign, he would not say “reason,” “the individual,” or “science”; rather, he would say without hesitation “the state.” It was, as it were, a self-evident proposition: he who says sovereignty, says the state.³ History testifies that the peoples of Europe and her former colonies were prepared to make almost any sacrifice to transform their polities into *states*. The task of state-making over-shadowed any particular ideology, creed or class: partisans of monarchy and democracy alike — even Marxists dedicated to the withering away of the state — all had to have a state. By mid-20th century, the results were catastrophic.

World War I saw nine-million people killed in battle, surpassed within a few decades by the 15 million battle deaths of World War II. In total, the total death count in the international and domestic wars, revolutions, and violent conflicts of the 20th century is about 35,654,000. If we add to this figure the number of non-battle deaths (democide), almost 360,000,000 men, women, and children have been shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to death; or buried alive, drowned, hung, and bombed. The dead even could conceivably be near people.⁴ And this does not even begin to estimate all of the other non-lethal uses of force: over individuals, associations, churches, economic activity.

When Leo XIII wrote his encyclicals, modern states were in the full-flush of their power — they knew nothing yet of the trenches of Verdun, or of the totalitarian regimes which would follow on the heels of the Great War. Elected pope in 1978, exactly one century after Leo XIII, John Paul came of course from Poland, the only major European nation that did not have its own state (except for a brief period after WWI). It is all the more interesting, then, that it was a Polish pope who set out to interpret this history culminating in 1989.

Having read *CA* many times over the past decade, eventually I found myself asking the question, why did it take him 13 years to write an encyclical on the state? This is not such an odd question if we consider the fact that the inaugural encyclical of every pope of the modern period dealt with the problem of the state. Let me put the

historical situation in exact numbers: from 1800 (election of Pius VII) to 1978 (JPII) there were thirteen popes, who issued a total of 267 encyclicals — 120 of which dealt with the problem of the state. The papacy was preoccupied with the state; so much so, that the term “social doctrine” is a misnomer; for issues of economic markets and society were treated in reference to pathologies of the political order.

Had JP followed the precedent of his predecessors, his first encyclical would have addressed the political situation in Poland. Surely, a pope from the most politically fraught sector of Europe would have something to say right away about Communist oppression of some 50 million Catholics behind the Iron Curtain.

Instead, he issued *Redemptor Hominis* (1979): not on the problem of the state, but rather on Jesus Christ as *salvator hominis*. It is the first inaugural encyclical in more than two centuries that does not make the state one of its major themes. Where his predecessors asked *Quid est Caesar* (what is Caesar), *RH* begins with the question posed by Psalm 8:

... what is man [*quid est homo*] that you should be mindful of him, or the son of man that you should care for him? You have made him a little less than the angels, and crowned him with glory and honor. You have given him rule over the works of your hands...⁵

To the question, “What is man?” — the Pope answers, participated royalty. In his first trip to Poland after being elected Pope — a trip that would forever change the history of central Europe — he called the Poles *piasts*, sovereigns, or those who are crowned.⁶ So, too, in his trip to Cameroon, he referred to the African youth as “being crowned” according to Ps. 8.4-6.⁷

The chief question of political theology is this: In light of divine revelation, what is man and what is he entitled to rule? Today, I want to discuss with you how JPII endeavored to move this question from the *state* to its original location in theological anthropology.

This orientation was perhaps already evident in his decision, after becoming Pope, to retain the coat of arms he had borne as Archbishop of Krakow. (Incidentally, the Prefect of the Papal Household in 1978, Msgr. Jacques Martin, later reported that JPII was pressured to adopt a conventional coat of arms). Completely missing are the typical symbols of his predecessors: the fleur-de-lis, the castles, the stars and shooting comets, the eagles — all of which represent princely and familial, in any case, human

symbols of authority to rule. In their place we find a blue shield, with a slightly off-centered gold Latin cross; and under this cross is the letter *M*, for Mary, who represents the Church at the foot of the cross.⁸ In answer to the question *Quid est homo*, the armorial shield answers, *Ecce homo* – Behold the Man.

RH is the first of a trilogy of encyclicals on the divine trinity. In each, the Pope makes the same move: what does it mean “to rule?,” is turned back to the question “what is man,” and the anthropological question is developed in the light of things revealed: by the Son, then about the Father, and finally through the Spirit. Here, I summarize:

In *Redemptor hominis* (1979), he proposes to discern the *signa temporis*, the signs of the time. The most important *signa*, he contends, are not the works of modern man: the organization of the state, science, and technology, but man in flight from himself, in fear of the very works of his own dominion. “This gives rise to a question: Why is it that the power given to man from the beginning by which he was to subdue the earth turns against himself.” (*RH* §15). He sets out to answer the question, first, in Genesis, and then in the light of Christ the new Adam, who is the image of the invisible God and who not only reveals the Father to man, but also man to himself.

In *Dives in misericordia* (1980), on the Father, the Pope discusses God’s rule made visible in the creature. How is the invisible “made known” (from the Latin verb, *enarrare*, which can mean to make manifest, to declare, and to interpret). Just as in *RH*, he studies the question by going back to Genesis to see how human dominion makes visible the rule of the Father, and then to the Gospels to expound the relationship between justice and mercy in divine rule. He makes two very interesting points (again, only to summarize): first, that desacralization is always an attack upon, or a forgetting of, the invisible made visible: chiefly, man himself (§12); second, that justice without mercy cannot restore man to himself (§14). Thus, man imitates divine rule not only by making judgments concerning justice (saying what belongs to whom), but also by being “rich in mercy” – thus the title of the encyclical, *Dives in misericordia*. The sign of divine rule is the relationship between mercy and humility.

Finally, in *Dominus et vivificantem* (1986), he comments on a line in *Gaudium et spes*: “when God is forgotten the creature itself becomes unintelligible.” (*GS* §36, *Dominus et Viv* §38). Among the things which become unintelligible is ruling and being ruled. Thus follows a disquisition on human conscience.

I find it very interesting that in his encyclicals and other teaching documents between 1978 and 1991, JP develops the theme of ruling and being ruled in light of two key sections of *Lumen Gentium*, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, issued by

the Second Vatican Council on 21 November 1964.

The first is *LG* §36, where the Council fathers speak of Christ constituting his disciples “in a royal freedom” [*in regali libertati*] and teaching them what it means to enjoy the property or virtue of ruling [*regalitas*, which is usually translated “being a king”]. Here, *LG* asserts that revelation teaches that “To serve is to reign” [*servire regnare est*].⁹ The first and final word of Scripture on ruling power is that whoever rules must serve rather than being served.

The second is *LG* §31, where the laity are said to participate in the priestly, prophetic, and kingly office of Christ. This teaching on the *munera Christi* is discussed in almost every teaching document of this pontificate. Indeed, *JPII* calls it a *ratio novitatis*, the novel element, in the teachings of Vatican II. Later, he will say that: “In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, at the beginning of my pastoral ministry, my aim was to emphasize forcefully the priestly, prophetic and kingly dignity of the entire People of God.”¹⁰ Intrigued by the repeated use of the word *munus* in the documents of Vatican II, Janet Smith discovered that the word was used at least 248 times by the Council.¹¹

The word *munus* is usually, but badly, translated into English as “function.” Living as we do in an age of machines, and biological reductionism, the word “function” is apt to conjure the wrong meaning. In pre-Christian Rome the word *munus* meant the ancient Etruscan ritual of serving the dead by shedding blood on (or in the vicinity) of ancestral graves. Thus the origin of the gladiatorial contest. The earliest recorded *munus* in the city of Rome was given at the Forum Boarium in 264 by Junius Pera in memory of his father. The gladiatorial contest was not called a “game” (*ludus*) but rather a “service” (*munus*) by which the dead are revived and propitiated by blood. In other contexts it signified a duty or a gift of service [Munificent is from Latin *munifi-cus*, generous, bountiful, from *munus*, gift — not to be confused with a *donatio*, which signifies the disposal of property. Hence, the word community, *communitas*, derives etymology of sharing gifts, not the transfer of property].¹² The word *munus* is frequently used in the Vulgate translation — repeatedly, for example, to give the corresponding Latin word for various aspects of Jewish ritual. In Mt. 2.11, the Magi giving *munera* to the Christ child; the same for the widow’s mite in Lk. 21.1; and the sacrifice of the high priest in Epistle to the Heb. 8.3.¹³ Christian theologians spoke of the *triplex munus Christi*: priest, prophet, and king.¹⁴

During the pontificate of Pius XI (1922-29), individuals, families, corporations,

churches, the state itself,¹⁵ and international authorities,¹⁶ were said to be the bearers not only of *iura* (rights) but also of *munera* — of having roles to play, gifts to give. In the deepest sense, human rights are exemplified in *munera*, whether natural or supernatural.¹⁷ In the Pian encyclicals, the concept of subsidiarity is elucidated first in the idea of a plurality of *munera*, and only secondarily in juridical terms. Thus, the notion of the *munus* unifies two things which are so often split apart in modern political and social thought: first, what man claims as his own, and second, what man has to give as a gift of service.¹⁸

This is a very important point.¹⁹ Rights are not derived from human nature abstractly considered, but rather from human nature as already bearing (implicitly or explicitly) social *munera*.²⁰ On this view, rights flow from antecedent *munera* (gifts, duties, vocations, missions); hence, it is quite different than the idea of a right as an immunity — *immunitas*, etymologically, implies the absence of a *munus*.

I might add that one of the reasons commentators have had such problems understanding the term “social justice” is that, for Pius XI, social justice is nothing other than the manifold organicity of the common good; or, to put it in another way, it is the demand that the common good be brought about through organizations, institutions, and groups.²¹ According to Pius XI, social justice ensues when “when each individual member is given what it needs for the exercise of its proper function....all that is necessary for the exercise of his social *munus*...” Social justice, therefore, should not be confused with distributive justice. On the assumption that men and women already have *munera*, indeed, that they are already perform acts which redound to the common good, the role of the political community is facilitative.

Subsidiarity, therefore, is a principle derivative from social justice: namely, that when *subsidium* be given either by the parts to the whole or the whole to the parts the plurality of functions or *munera* should not be destroyed or absorbed.²² As I understand it, this is why Pius XI and Pius XII began to apply the idea of *munera* beyond their original meaning in theology and ecclesiology.²³ It is worth noting that in some 30 Pian encyclicals, the word *ius* (“right”) is used more than 400 times; in 93% of the time, the word is attributed to an authority or to a source of responsibility other than the state. Furthermore, when Pius attributes a “right” to the state it is almost always connected to the responsibility of the state to recognize and protect prior rights (of the family, spouses, children; of God, the Church, local ecclesiastical authority, and its seminaries, schools, and charitable organizations; of property, labor, association.²⁴ But what organizes the ever accumulating list of rights in the Pian encyclicals are the

munera, which provide the teleological and social framework for the juridical conception of rights.²⁵

Indeed, the Council consolidated Pius XI's social doctrine by highlighting the perfectionistic rather than merely negative meaning of rights.

LG makes use of the idea of the *munus* to do two things.

- In the Note of Explication appended to *LG*, the word *munera* is used to explain the interrelation of ruling powers within the Church: "it is a question of *munera* which have to be exercised *by a plurality of subjects* cooperating hierarchically by the will of Christ" — A communion of diverse agents having services to render to the whole body.²⁶ Cardinal Felici explains that this is a better word than *potestates*, powers, because without the *munera* the powers would appear aimless, non-participatory, unilateral, inorganic, anonymous (one might say, precisely those characteristics of the modern state which have proved so troubling over the past four hundred years).
- After treating the initiation of the laity, by baptism, into the *triplex munera Christi*,²⁷ *Lumen Gentium* (§35) says that the laity have the *munus* (here quoting Ephesians 6.12) wrestling "against the cosmocrats of this dark age, against the spiritual forces of wickedness."²⁸ *LG* explains (§36) that the participated royalty of the laity is expressed, first, in conquering "the reign of sin in themselves," and second, by "serving Christ in their fellow men they might by humility and patience lead their brethren to that King for whom to serve is to reign."

As I said, JPII calls the development of this concept of the *munera* the element of novelty in the work of the Vatican Council, and pledged to devote his own pastoral ministry to giving it the emphasis it deserves in the Church's theology.

In his first encyclical, for example, he proposes that human dignity has to be rediscovered as a "kingship" [*regalitas*], a notion, he adds, that is "linked to every sphere of Christian and human morality." This *munus regale*, he continues, has three characteristic activities:

in the person, *regalitas* means the act of self-mastery, made mature by virtue;

in the world, *regalitas* means the act dominion over the physical things, signifying the priority of spirit over matter; in *Laborem exercens* (1981), for example, he treats the problem of human labor in light of the *triplex*

munus Christi (§24) – sorting out how dominion relates to ruling oneself and ruling others.

in the social world, *regalitas* is expressed in acts of service, according to Mt. 20.28, serving rather than being served.²⁹ In his biography of the Pope, George Weigel discusses this principle as the “Law of the Gift.”³⁰

In 1979, he began a five-year cycle of audiences on theology of the body. The following sentence, from the Feb. 20, 1980 conference summarizes the main thesis of the entire cycle of conferences: “The body, in fact, and only it, is capable of making visible what is invisible: the spiritual and the divine. It was created to transfer into the visible reality of the world the mystery hidden from eternity in God, and thus to be its sign.” To understand man it is necessary to enter into the mystery of this *signum* – the human body, which is the *imago dei*, and which at the very beginning discloses a nuptial relationship.³¹

So, here in Genesis, we find the original meaning of participated royalty.³² Divine rule is made visible in (1) dominion over things of the earth, (2) mastery over one’s own body, and (3) in reciprocal rule over one another’s bodies. Interestingly, the first sign of the social *munus regale* is not the state but rather what the Pope calls the “proto-sacramental” institution of matrimony.

Something new, however, is introduced at Genesis 3.16, “he shall rule over you.” As the Pope puts it, in the “state of lapsed nature” Adam and Eve seem to be “driven back to another plane.”³³ With sin, the first note of ruling (self mastery) begins to look like the act of dominion originally exercised over physical things rather than the rule of persons.³⁴ In *Mulieris dignitate* (1988) he continues this line of inquiry into the difference between ruling things and ruling persons. Returning to Genesis 3.16 he proposes that: “This “domination” indicates the disturbance and loss of the stability of that fundamental equality which the man and the woman possess in the “unity of the two.”³⁵ Thus, Genesis 3.16 must be compared with 1 Cor. 7.3-4, “For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the husband does; likewise, the husband does not rule over his own body, but the wife does.” Christ reveals the “royal dignity of service” by teaching that “to serve means to reign.”³⁶ Assuming in his own person “humanity as the inheritance of Adam,” Christ decisively answers the question posed in Psalm 8, *quid est homo?*³⁷ He “fully reveals man to himself,” among other ways, by restoring the institution of matrimony, relocating it in the rule of persons rather than the dominion over things.

In *Redemptoris Mater* (1987) the notion of participated royalty is developed in the context of Mariology. The Magnificat, he observes, exemplifies the correct understanding of ruling power — to serve is to reign.³⁸ In this way, Mary obtained “the state of royal freedom [*libertas regalis*]” proper to Christ’s disciples.³⁹ It is worth noting that at this point in time, the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith issued two instructions on liberation theology (1984, 1986). Cardinal Ratzinger writes that although the Magnificat has political implications, it should not be read exclusively as a teaching about the distribution of power.⁴⁰ In the 1986 *Instruction*, he argues that what is truly new in the Gospel is not the praxiological question of accumulating and redistributing power (even if it be for worthy ends). Rather, the Gospel discloses a new stance toward power. Explicating the teaching of the Council and the Pope on participated royalty, Cardinal Ratzinger insists that the *munus regale* requires the royal freedom of self-mastery and service.⁴¹

We have seen that terms suggestive of political order — coronation, dominion, mastery, ruling, kingship — have been used to understand quite an array of subjects: the relation between soul and body, dominion over things, human labor, marriage, Mariology, Christian discipleship, and liberation theology.

But, it might be asked, what has any of this to do with political order⁴² and authority in the ordinary sense of the term?

In the Apostolic Exhortation, *Familiaris consortio* (1981) — subtitled, “On the *Munera* of the Christian Family⁴³ — the Pope says that although the “kingly mission” is not to be reduced to politics, the proper and unique vocation of the laity includes what he calls the *munus sociale et politicum*.⁴⁴ The Exhortation was issued on the Feast of Christ the King; the preface of that liturgical feast is quoted in *LG* §36, where we also find the formula *cui servire regnare est* used so often by JP II. He quotes this formula again.⁴⁵ The laity are to order temporal things according to the *regnum Dei*.⁴⁶ *GS* says that the laity are to “inscribe” [*inscribatur*] the divine law in the life of the earthly city.⁴⁷

Here, the Pope is not especially interested in political constitutions, political parties, or a specific legislative agenda. Rather, he has two points in mind. First, the *munus politicum* is properly the service of laity, not priests. Second, whether or not the world understands it, political power finds its norm in kingship — not necessarily the constitutional office of the king, but in *regalitas*, the virtue of which is serving rather being served.⁴⁸ A virtue deeper than the issue of particular forms of government; indeed, he says that service is a fundamental element in the exercise of political power,

howsoever that power might be constitutionally configured.⁴⁹

These thoughts are made even more clear in *Christifidelis laici* (1988).

A new aspect to the grace and dignity coming from Baptism is here introduced: the lay faithful participate [*participes*], for their part, in the threefold *munus* of Christ as Priest, Prophet and King. This aspect has never been forgotten in the living tradition of the Church, as exemplified in the explanation which St. Augustine offers for Psalm 26 [here follows a quote from Augustine]: “David was anointed king. In those days only a king and a priest were anointed. These two persons prefigured the one and only priest and king who was to come, Christ (the name “Christ” means “anointed”). Not only has our head been anointed but we, his body, have also been anointed ... therefore anointing comes to all Christians, even though in Old Testament times it belonged only to two persons. Clearly we are the Body of Christ because we are all “anointed” and in him are “christs”, that is, “anointed ones”, as well as Christ himself, “*The Anointed One*”.⁵⁰

In the middle ages, the venerable image of *sponsus* and *sponsa*, Christ and his bride, was diverted from its proper and original context, in the sacrament of baptism, and was made to define the relations between the prince and his state. The King was given a ring to signify his solemn marriage to the realm. As James I said: “What god hath conjoined then, let no man separate.’ I am the husband, and all the whole island is my lawful wife; I am the head, and it is my body; I am the shepherd, and it is my flock.” In France, the coronation rite included the ritual of the sleeping king. On the morning of the coronation, prelates knocked three times on the door of the King, awakening him from a fictitious sleep. The significance of the ritual is debated. Perhaps like Adam put into a deep sleep before his betrothal to Eve (Gen. 2.21-23), or like the Bride in the Song of Songs, “I was sleeping, but my heart kept vigil” (Cant. 5.2), the King “awoke” and proceeded into the cathedral to marry his realm.

Before the age of Absolutism, the office of king exemplified the sanctified laity — these coronation rituals, properly understood, represented the dignities bestowed on every Christian at the time of his baptism. Interestingly, in panegyric to Constantine (the first important Christian statement on sanctified kingship), Eusebius of Caesarea contended that when Genesis teaches that man was made in the image and likeness of God it should be inferred that that God made Adam and Eve not a political animal, but a *basilikon zoon*, a royal animal; the restoration of the *imago dei* in Christ is not a work exclusively in the person of Constantine.

Though never entirely lost, the *munus regale* of the laity had been displaced before the Revolution destroyed the office of anointed kings. In early modernity, political Christendom devolved into an Old Testament model of two anointed rulers. As the Pope remarks, although the *munus regale* of the laity was never entirely forgotten, it was eclipsed, for all practical purposes, by the monarchs and their courts, who jealously guarded what they deemed an exclusive title to the kingly predicate.

From a theological point of view, political modernity did not fix the problem because it did not restore the status of *regalitas* to the people. Modern regimes might accommodate the anointing of priests so long as the *munus regale* of the priest is confined to a private or merely spiritual sphere. For their part, the baptized laity in modern times are considered citizens, whose chief responsibility is to legitimate political power — as a people, however, they reign without ruling. They have an abstract power, but no *munus regale*. Thus, the theological anthropology of participated royalty seems irrelevant to citizenship. Isn't this why JPII called his fellow Poles *piasts*?

Therefore, it was necessary to recover the predicates of kingly dignity. As I see it, this is precisely what JPII was trying to do in those thirteen years before he issued an encyclical on the state. And he had to do so very carefully. In the first place, it was not an idea familiar to the laity. In the second place, it was apt to be confused with other things: the vocation of the anointed laity might be confused with an anointed political party or liberationist program that anoints a particular class; or what was more likely, in the west, the *munus regale* might be taken merely as another way of talking about popular sovereignty.

In our time, the constitutional of forms of regimes is not a pressing question, at least not in principle. In the western world, most everyone agrees that political authority ought to be constitutionally limited and directed to the protection of human rights. There are important disagreements about particulars, but not about the broad picture. In the Catholic world, debate about forms of regimes was vigorous in the 19th century, particularly in France, where monarchists and republicans regarded this dispute as a kind of blood sport. The debate in France, however, was completely exhausted by the time of WWI. With the rise of totalitarian regimes after that War, the papacy and Catholics generally held the same position as everyone else in the west: namely, that the constitutional form of government must resist totalitarianism; in practice, that meant some form of constitutional democracy. In his Christmas radio addresses of 1942 and 1944, Pope Pius XII put the Church squarely behind constitutional democracy, and with the exception of the liberation theologians in the 1960s, there has been no significant controversy over forms of regimes. Rather, the problems stood at a deeper level: not the existence of political liberty, but its meaning

and use in the light of theological anthropology. Here, the soil was (and *is*) very shallow. And so it was here that JPII began his teaching.

Conclusion:

By way of conclusion, I can make three points.

- First, JPII continued the work of Pius XI, Pius XII, and the Vatican Council in saying that ruling is better understood as a *munus* than a *potestas*. The most important thing in the visible world is not the state. Some Enlightenment theorists wanted to say this, but didn't know how. For their scenario of the state of nature was meant to be an alternative to Genesis, and, not surprisingly, it could not disclose man in his *munera*; an individual with rights, to be sure, but not *regalitas*.⁵¹
- Second, the Catholic response to the modern conception of the natural man as a bearer of rights who becomes a citizen without kingly predicates was, at first, to re-emphasize the rightful prerogatives of Christian princes. The *munus politicum* of the laity was slow to develop, among other reasons because it seemed too close to the problem of the anti-clerical, laicist states which sought to subordinate the Church. But it did emerge in the teachings of Pius XI; and JPII correctly perceived its importance. For the chief problem of our time is not teaching Catholics how to be citizens of constitutional democracies, but how to recover their baptismal dignity as kings.⁵²
- Third, JPII was trying to correct a tendency among Catholics to view the Church's social doctrine as a set of prescriptions about political and economic policies — prescriptions and analyses related only extraneously to theology proper. In *Sollicitudo rei socialis* and in *Centesimus annus* he will emphasize that social doctrine is theology. And in *Centesimus annus* he writes:

“As such, it proclaims God and his mystery of salvation in Christ to every human being, and for that very reason reveals man to himself. In this light, *and only in this light*, does it concern itself with everything else: the human rights of the individual, and in particular of the “working class,” the family and education, the duties of the State, the ordering of national and international society, economic life, culture, war and peace, and respect for life from the moment of conception until death.” (§54).⁵³

We might say that the Pope was also trying to head-off a misreading of the *signa temporis* (the signs of the time). Not so much the external organization of human liberty (constitutions, markets, applied sciences), but the flight of man from himself; the possibility that men can fashion adequate solutions to the external order of liberty even while evacuating that liberty of any anthropological density.

This is exactly what he was trying to explain to the recently liberated peoples of central and eastern Europe. I have brought you to the cusp of *Centesimus annus*, John Paul's great encyclical on the state and social order. And I will have to leave you right there.

¹ If we peruse the documents of Vatican II as well as JPII's own work, we will see that Leo's *Diuturnum* (1881), *Immortale Dei* (1885), and *Libertas* (1888) have had a deeper impact on the development of Catholic political and social thought. But popes have set their teaching calendars to *RN* because it was the first modern encyclicals taken seriously by the secular regimes. As JPII notes in *CA*, it gave the Church "citizen status" [*civitatis status*].

² See Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State*. London: Routledge, 1996.

³ The darkest, but perhaps the most accurate, depiction of the modern political project was given by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes taught that the incarnate and resurrected God-man, who lives and governs, was to be replaced in the visible world by a mortal god (a *deus mortalis*) — a machine-like man, mythologically known as the Leviathan. Scholars can debate whether a perverse Christology is at the origin of the modern state. Engraving on the title page of the 1651 edition of the *Leviathan*. Job 41.24 *non est potestas super terram quae compar-etur ei*. "Upon the earth there is not his like"

⁴ R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government*.

⁵ *Redemptor hominis* §8 (4 Mar. 1979); AAS/71 (1979) at 272. In the Latin Vulgate the words signifying ruling power are perhaps more evident:

quid est homo quoniam recordaris eius vel filius hominis quoniam visitas eum
minues eum paulo minus a Deo gloria et *decore coronabis* eum
dabis ei *potestatem super opera manuum tuarum*.

⁶ Address at Gniezno (3 June 1979). See L'OR Eng. ed 11 June 1979, 7-9. GHW 41

⁷ Given at Yaoundé, in Cameroon, on 14 September 1995 on the Feast of the Triumph of the Cross. See *Ecclesia in Africa* §82. For his use of Ps 8.4-6: EV §35, §82, §84; Ltr to Families §10; *Mulieris* §§10-11.

⁸ Msgr. Jacques Martin, Prefect of the Papal Household in 1978, reports that there was considerable pressure for the new Pope to adopt a conventional blazon. Jacques Martin, *Heraldry in the Vatican* (Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire: Van Duren Pub., 1987), 257f.

⁹ Pius XII in 1942 radio, Univ validity of reigning in serving (136 otl).

¹⁰ On the *ratio novitatis* see the Apostolic Constitution *Sacrae disciplinae leges*, 25 Jan. 1983, AAS/75 (1983), at XII [Enchiridion Vaticanum, vol. 8, at 510]; for the pledge, see the Apostolic Exhortation, *Christifideles laici*, 30 Dec. 1988, AAS/81 (1988) §14 at 412 [Enchiridion Vaticanum, vol. 11 at 1052].

¹¹ The original version of this paper can be found in the *International Review of Natural Family Planning* 11.3 (Fall, 1987).

¹² Or a gift received: "Hence, as Leo XIII so wisely taught in *Rerum Novarum*: "whoever has received from the divine bounty a large share of temporal blessings [*quicumque maiorem copiam*

bonorum Dei munere accepit], whether they be external and corporeal, or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature [*ad perfectionem*], and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the steward of God's Providence, for the benefit of others. 'He that hath a talent,' says St. Gregory the Great, 'let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him quicken himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and the utility thereof with his neighbor.'" *Mater et magistra* §119, AAS/53 (1961) at 430. Citing *Rerum novarum* §22 [Acta Leonis, 11 (1891) at 114, EE3 at 897

¹³ The Vulgate uses *munus* for translating the various terms of Jewish ritual.

¹⁴ CCC: 92 The ministerial priesthood differs in essence from the common priesthood of the faithful because it confers a sacred power for the service of the faithful. The ordained ministers exercise their service for the People of God by teaching (*munus docendi*), divine worship (*munus liturgicum*) and pastoral governance (*munus regendi*).

¹⁵ "In this same Encyclical of Ours We have shown that the means of saving the world of today from the lamentable ruin into which a moral liberalism has plunged us, are neither the class-struggle nor terror, nor yet the autocratic abuse of State power, but rather the infusion of social justice and the sentiment of Christian love into the social-economic order. We have indicated how a sound prosperity is to be restored according to the true principles of a sane corporative system which respects the proper hierarchic structure of society; and how all the occupational groups should be fused into a harmonious unity inspired by the principle of the common good. And the genuine and chief *munus* of public and civil authority consists precisely in the efficacious furthering of this harmony and coordination of all social forces." *Divini redemptoris* §31, AAS/29 (1937), at 81. And Pius XII in *Summi pontificatus*: "it is the noble prerogative and *munus* of the *civitas* to control, aid and direct the private and individual activities of national life that they converge harmoniously towards the common good." §59; EE6 46, AAS/31 433. Designed to assist and coordinate "the natural perfection of man," the *civitas* is said to be *quasi instrumentum*.

See John XXIII in *Pacem in terris*: In determining what form a particular government shall take, and the way in which it shall function [*sua...munera*], a major consideration will be the prevailing circumstances and the condition of the people; and these are things which vary in different places and at different times. We think, however, that it is in keeping with human nature for the State to be given a form which embodies a threefold division of public office properly corresponding to the three main functions of public authority [*muneribus*]. In such a State a precise legal framework is provided, not only for the official functions of government, but also for the mutual relations between citizens and public officials. This will obviously afford sure protection to citizens, both in the safeguarding of their rights and in the fulfilment of their duties. *Pacem in terris* §68; ASS/55 (1963) AT 276

On the instrumental *munus* of the state, again in *Pacem in terris*:

It must be clearly laid down that the principal function of public authorities is to recognize, respect, co-ordinate, safeguard and promote citizens' rights and duties [*utque distincte decernatur praecipuum eorumdem esse munus, civium iura et munera agnoscere, colere, invicem componere, tueri, ad processum provehere*]." *Pacem in terris* §77; ASS/55 (1963) at 279. Note here that *munus* of the state is to recognize, respect, coordinate, promote, safeguard the plural *iura et munera*.

Hence the public authority of the world community must likewise have as its special aim the recognition, respect, safeguarding and promotion of the rights of the human person. This can be done by direct action, if need be, or by the creation throughout the world of the sort of conditions in which rulers of individual States can more easily carry out their specific functions [*munera*].

Pacem in terris §139; ASS/55 (1963) at 294.

In conformance with divine order: Hence among the very serious obligations incumbent upon men of high principles [*virorum muneribus*], We must include the task of establishing new relationships in human society, under the mastery and guidance of truth, justice, charity and freedom—relations between individual citizens, between citizens and their respective States, between States, and finally between individuals, families, intermediate associations [*interposita corpora*] and States on the one hand, and the world community on the other. There is surely no one who will not consider this a most exalted task, for it is one which is able to bring about true peace in accordance with divinely established order [*Quod profecto munus nemo praeclarissimum non censuerit, quippe quo ver pax, iuncta ordinem a Deo statum, coalscere possit*]. *Pacem in terris* §163; ASS/55 (1963) at 301f.

¹⁶ See, too, John XXIII in *Pacem in terris*: “But it is no part of the duty of universal authority to limit the sphere of action of the public authority of individual States, or to arrogate any of their functions to itself. On the contrary, its essential purpose is to create world conditions in which the public authorities of each nation, its citizens and intermediate groups, can carry out their tasks, fulfill their duties and claim their rights with greater security [*sed etiam singuli homines et interpositi coetus possint tutius sua munera obire, suar praestare officia, sua iure vindicare*]. *Pacem in terris* (11 April 1963), §141; AAS/55 (1963), at 295. At §145, the UN is said to have *munera*. This passage is found in the section on subsidiarity.

¹⁷ Thus the matrimonial *munus* as a participation in divine rule:

“Nor must We omit to remark, in fine, that since the duty entrusted to parents for the good of their children [*hoc munus parentibus in bonum prolis commissum*] is of such high dignity and of such great importance, every use of the faculty given by God for the procreation of new life is the right and the privilege of the married state alone, by the law of God and of nature, and must be confined absolutely within the sacred limits of that state [*intra sacros connubii limites est omnino continendus*].” *Casti connubii*, §18; AAS/22 (1930) at 546.

“It is of the utmost importance that parents exercise their right and obligation toward the younger generation by securing for their children a sound cultural and religious formation. They must also educate them to a deep sense of responsibility in life, especially in such matters as concern the foundation of a family and the procreation and education of children. They must instill in them an unshakable confidence in Divine Providence and a determination to accept the inescapable sacrifices and hardships involved in so noble and important a task [*munus*] as the co-operation with God in the transmitting of human life and the bringing up of children. *Mater et magistra* §195, AAS/53 (1961) at 448.

¹⁸ Also holds together the Aristotelian notion of an *ergon* or characteristic function with the biblical idea of a vocation. See John XIII in *Pacem in terris*: It is generally accepted today that the common good is best safeguarded when personal rights and duties [*iuribus et officiis*] are guaranteed. The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that these rights are recognized, respected, co-ordinated, defended and promoted, and that each individual is enabled to perform his duties [*officiis*] more easily. For “to safeguard the inviolable rights [*inviolabilia iura*] of the human person, and to facilitate the performance of his duties [*ut facilius quisque suis muneribus defungatur*], is the principal duty of every public authority.” *Pacem in terris* §60, AAS/55 (1963) at 274. Citing Pius XII, *Nuntius radiophonicus*, Pentecost 1941 [AAS/33 (1941), 200.

¹⁹ See Pius XII in *Summi pontificatus*: “man and the family are by nature anterior to the State, and that the Creator has given to both of them powers and rights [*iura facultatesque*] and has assigned them a mission [*munus*] and a charge that correspond to undeniable natural requirements.” §61; EE6 46, AAS/31 at 434.

²⁰ This is how natural rights can be derived from natural law. Law, by definition, moves a multitude toward a common good. Natural law considers man in his social functions. Developed by popes who were self-consciously Thomistic; see Leo on officium and ius; See Leo XIII on property —

²¹ In reality, *besides commutative justice, there is also social justice* with its own set obligations, from which neither employers nor workingmen can escape. Now it is of the very essence of social justice to demand for each individual all that is necessary for the common good. But just as in the living organism it is impossible to provide for the good of the whole unless each single part and each individual member is given what it needs for the exercise of its proper *function*, so it is impossible to care for the social organism and the good of society as a unit unless each single part and each individual member—that is to say, each individual man in the dignity of his human personality—is supplied with all that is necessary for the exercise of his social *munus* [*ad sociale munus cuiusque suu exercendum*]. If social justice be satisfied, the result will be an intense activity in economic life as a whole, pursued in tranquillity and order. This activity will be proof of the health of the social body, just as the health of the human body is recognized in the undisturbed regularity and perfect efficiency of the whole organism. *Divini redemptoris* (19 March 1937), §51, AAS/29 (1937) at 92.

²² Such as craft and work: “For, according to Christian teaching, man, endowed with a social nature, is placed on this earth so that by leading a life in society and under an authority ordained of God[54] he may fully cultivate and develop all his faculties unto the praise and glory of his Creator; and that by faithfully fulfilling the duties of his craft or other calling he may obtain for himself [*atque artis aliusve vocationis suae munere fideliter*] temporal and at the same time eternal happiness. Socialism, on the other hand, wholly ignoring and indifferent to this sublime end of both man and society, affirms that human association has been instituted for the sake of material advantage alone.” *Quadragesimo anno* (15 May 1931), §118; AAS/23 (1931) at 215.

²³ The recent Synod of Bishops in Rome debated the applicability of subsidiarity to ecclesiology. Liberals, of course, contended that Rome is merely a steering device for the activities of local churches; others responded that subsidiarity is a social and economic doctrine that has no immediate applicability to the constitution of the Church. It seems to me that neither position is quite right. First, subsidiarity does not tell us who has which function or *munus*. One has to look elsewhere (natural law, positive law, divine law) for the *munera*. Therefore, subsidiarity cannot be used to settle the distribution of *munera*; rather, it is a principle governing the exercise of already-distributed functions. Subsidiarity, in other words, is not the same thing as “devolution,” which in contemporary political debate usually signifies a higher or more central organ giving power to lesser bodies. On the other hand, subsidiarity is not just a principle for sociology and economics.

²⁴ Mary Elsbernd. *Papal Statements on Rights: A historical Contextual Study of Encyclical Teaching From Pius VI – Pius XI (1791-1939)*. Dissertation. Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium), 1985, word count at 607, 627.

²⁵ Elsbernd unfortunately does not provide the word count for the use of *munera*. She is surely correct to note that the concept of the *munus* is more dynamic, evoking “rights which could only be realized in society and the realization of which perfected the society.” At 629.

²⁶ Pericles Felici explains the *communio eccles.* Use of *munus* rather than *potestas*: first because it is power ready for action *ad actum expedita*, awaiting its canonical and juridical determination; second, because it is in the very nature of the thing, *ex natura rei*, a plurality of subjects cooperating hierarchically. See Tanner 899.

²⁷ In §31: “These faithful are by baptism made one body with Christ and are constituted among the People of God; they are in their own way made sharers in the priestly, prophetic, and kingly functions of Christ; and they carry out for their own part the mission of the whole Christian people

in the Church and in the world.”

²⁸ Lumen gentium §35 very important: cosmocrats of the dark aeon: . They conduct themselves as children of the promise, and thus strong in faith and in hope they make the most of the present,(201) and with patience await the glory that is to come.(202) Let them not, then, hide this hope in the depths of their hearts, but even in the program of their secular life let them express it by a continual conversion and by wrestling “against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual forces of wickedness.(Eph 6.12)

²⁹ “rediscovering in oneself and others the special dignity of our vocation that can be described as “kingship” [*regalitas*]. This dignity is expressed in readiness to serve, in keeping with the example of Christ, who “came not to be served but to serve”(Mt. 20.28). If, in the light of this attitude of Christ's, “being a king” is truly possible only by “being a servant” then “being a servant” also demands so much spiritual maturity that it must really be described as “being a king”. In order to be able to serve others worthily and effectively we must be able to master ourselves, possess the virtues that make this mastery possible. Our sharing in Christ's kingly mission – his “kingly function” [*muneris regalis*] – is closely linked with every sphere of both Christian and human morality. RH §21, AAS/71 (4 Mar. 1979) at 316 [Enchiridion Delle Encicliche, vol. 8, at 122].

“This is expressed by the Second Vatican Council in these beautiful chapters of its teaching that concern man's “kingship”; that is to say his call to share in the kingly function-the munus regale of Christ himself [*ad communicandum cum Christo ‘munus regale*] [n. 101, to Lumen Gentium 10, 36]. The essential meaning of this “kingship” and “dominion” [*munus regale illudque dominium*] of man over the visible world, which the Creator himself gave man for his task, consists in the priority of ethics over technology, in the primacy of the person over things, and in the superiority of spirit over matter.” RH §16, AAS/71

³⁰ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope* (1999), 136-37. Thomas here quotes Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*: “Everything that is not lessened by being imparted, is not, if it be possessed without being communicated, possessed as it ought to be possessed.” “Everything that is not lessened by being imparted, is not, if it be possessed without being communicated, possessed as it ought to be possessed.” [*unde de communicatione spiritualium rerum dicit Augustinus in primo libro De doctrina christiana Omnis res quae dando non deficit, dum habetur et non datur nondum habetur quomodo habenda est*” – Contra impugnantes, I.4. Cap 4 §14 A83 1265-70]

³¹ See Pius XI: “How great a boon of God this is, and how great a blessing of matrimony is clear from a consideration of man's dignity and of his sublime end. For man surpasses all other visible creatures by the superiority of his rational nature alone. Besides, God wishes men to be born not only that they should live and fill the earth, but much more that they may be worshippers of God, that they may know Him and love Him and finally enjoy Him for ever in heaven; and this end, since man is raised by God in a marvelous way to the supernatural order, surpasses all that eye hath seen, and ear heard, and all that hath entered into the heart of man.[15] From which it is easily seen how great a gift of divine goodness and how remarkable a fruit of marriage are children born by the omnipotent power of God through the cooperation of those bound in wedlock.” *Casti connubii*, §12; AAS/22 (1930) at 544.

³² Effort to understand the experiences “that are always at the root of every human experience” TB 51, audience 12/12/79; Meaning of GS §24, man can only discover himself by making a gift of himself, TB 63, audience 1/16/80. The nuptial meaning of the body; Sleep in Adam, developed in notes 13=14 of the 10/7/79 audience, at TB 95

³³ TB 126 “almost.”

³⁴ See Pius XI: “But it forbids that exaggerated liberty which cares not for the good of the family; it

forbids that in this body which is the family, the heart be separated from the head to the great detriment of the whole body and the proximate danger of ruin. For if the man is the head, the woman is the heart, and as he occupies the chief place in ruling, so she may and ought to claim for herself the chief place in love [*haec amoris principatum sibi ut proprium vindicare potest et debet.*]” *Casti connubii*, §27; AAS/22 (1930) at 549. Ruling is serving.

³⁵ Therefore when we read in the biblical description the words addressed to the woman: “Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you” (Gen 3:16), we discover a break and a constant threat precisely in regard to this “unity of the two” which corresponds to the dignity of the image and likeness of God in both of them. But this threat is more serious for the woman, since domination takes the place of “being a sincere gift” and therefore living “for” the other: “he shall rule over you”. This “domination” indicates the disturbance and loss of the stability of that fundamental equality which the man and the woman possess in the “unity of the two”: and this is especially to the disadvantage of the woman, whereas only the equality resulting from their dignity as persons can give to their mutual relationship the character of an authentic “*communio personarum*”. While the violation of this equality, which is both a gift and a right deriving from God the Creator, involves an element to the disadvantage of the woman, at the same time it also diminishes the true dignity of the man. Here we touch upon an extremely sensitive point in the dimension of that “ethos” which was originally inscribed by the Creator in the very creation of both of them in his own image and likeness. §10, *Mulieris dignitate*, 15 Aug. 1988 AAS/80 1674, EE vol. 11 at 744

This statement in Genesis 3:16 is of great significance. It implies a reference to the mutual relationship of man and woman in marriage. It refers to the desire born in the atmosphere of spousal love whereby the woman's “sincere gift of self” is responded to and matched by a corresponding “gift” on the part of the husband. Only on the basis of this principle can both of them, and in particular the woman, “discover themselves” as a true “unity of the two” according to the dignity of the person. The matrimonial union requires respect for and a perfecting of the true personal subjectivity of both of them. The woman cannot become the “object” of “domination” and male “possession”. But the words of the biblical text directly concern original sin and its lasting consequences in man and woman. Burdened by hereditary sinfulness, they bear within themselves the constant “inclination to sin”, the tendency to go against the moral order which corresponds to the rational nature and dignity of man and woman as persons. This tendency is expressed in a threefold concupiscence, which Saint John defines as the lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh and the pride of life (cf. 1 Jn 2:16). The words of the Book of Genesis quoted previously (3: 16) show how this threefold concupiscence, the “inclination to sin”, will burden the mutual relationship of man and woman. §10, AAS/80 1675f, EE vol. 11 at 746.

³⁶ *Mulieris dignitate* §5 AAS/80 1661, EE vol. 11 at 720.

³⁷ *Id.*, §11, AAS/80 1679, EE vol. 11 at 754

³⁸ §41. 25 March 1987; AAS/79 (1987), at 417 [*Enchiridion Delle Encicliche*, vol. 8 at 690.

³⁹ See also, *Redemptoris custos* (Apost. Exhort 1989) on St. Joseph: living participation in *munus regale*.

⁴⁰ *Libertatis Nuntius* Instruction On Certain Aspects Of The “Theology Of Liberation”, Given at Rome, at the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, on August 6, 1984, the Feast of the Transfiguration of Our Lord. “Thus, a major importance is given to the Exodus event inasmuch as it is a liberation from political servitude. Likewise, a political reading of the “Magnificat” is proposed. The mistake here is not in bringing attention to a political dimension of the readings of Scripture, but in making of this one dimension the principal or exclusive component. This leads to

a reductionist reading of the Bible.” X.5.

⁴¹ Instruction on Christian liberty and liberation, *De libertate christiana* (22 March 1986), §30; AAS/79 (1987), at 566. “By obeying the divine law inscribed in his conscience and received as an impulse of the Holy Spirit, man exercises true mastery over himself and thus realizes his royal vocation as a child of God. “By the service of God he reigns.” Authentic freedom is the “service of justice,” while the choice of disobedience and evil is the “slavery of sin.”

⁴² It should be mentioned that this threefold act of kingship (self-rule, dominion, and service of others) is quite ancient. In his 336 panegyric to Constantine, on the occasion of his 30th anniversary as Emperor, Eusebius of Caesarea contends that when Genesis teaches that man is made in the image and likeness of God, it should be inferred that God “made him a royal creature [*basilikon zoon*]” — not mere a political but a kingly animal. The signs of this royal authority are dominion over the world, the royal virtue of self-control, and use of power in conformance with the Invisible Word rather than the promptings of demons. See O’Donovan, at 61.

⁴³ Familiaris consortio (22 No. 1981), *De Familiae christianae muneribus*, AAS/73 (1981), Enchiridion Vatican vol 7.

⁴⁴ The social role [*Sociale munus*] that belongs to every family pertains by a new and original right to the Christian family, which is based on the sacrament of marriage. By taking up the human reality of the love between husband and wife in all its implications, the sacrament gives to Christian couples and parents a power and a commitment to live their vocation as lay people and therefore to “seek the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them according to the plan of God.”(113: Lumen Genium §31) §47, AAS 139, Evat 1500

The social and political role [*Sociale et politicum munus*] is included in the kingly mission of service in which Christian couples share by virtue of the sacrament of marriage, and they receive both a command which they cannot ignore and a grace which sustains and stimulates them. §47 AAS 139, Evat 1500

⁴⁵ Id. §63, AAS/73 at 156, Enchiridion Vat. vol. 7 at 1536.

⁴⁶ Familiaris, §47, AAS/73 at 139, Enchirid. Vat. vol. 7 at 1500.

⁴⁷ “Laymen should also know that it is generally the function of their well-formed Christian conscience to see that the divine law is inscribed in the life of the earthly city [*ut lex divina in civitatis terrenaе vita inscribatur*]; from priests they may look for spiritual light and nourishment.” §43 CDD 745. In Familiaris: **Lex indita**: The law of Christian life is to be found not in a written code [*non in scripto*], but in the personal action of the Holy Spirit who inspires and guides the Christian. It is the “law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus”(159) “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.”(160) §63 AAS 156, Evat 1534

⁴⁸ Just as Christ exercises His royal power by serving us,(161) so also the Christian finds the authentic meaning of his participation in the kingship of his Lord [*dignitas regalis*] in sharing His spirit and practice of service to man. §63 followed again by Lumen Genium §36 on to serve is to reign, AAS 156, Evat 1536

⁴⁹ Christifidelis §42, AAS/81 473, Evat 1158

⁵⁰ Christifidelis laici – Apost Exhort (30 Dec. 1988) §14; AAS/81 (1989) at 410, Enchiridion Vaticanum vol. 11 at 1050.

⁵¹ Criticism, perhaps he does not go far enough in exploiting the interweaving of munus and ius developed by Pius XI and XII. To be sure, not a substitute for the juridical and legal frame, but a better term for solidarity and subsidiarity

⁵² Hence, the usefulness of what might be called the *analogia regalitatis*.

⁵³ In *RH*, section (§13), the Holy Father warns that in proclaiming this message the Church “must in no way be confused with a political community, nor bound to any political system. She is at once a sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human person.”